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I. INTRODUCTION
In most states, the landman profession is unregulated and free to
define itself. Work performed by landmen often flirts with the practice
of law, but under Texas law much of the work that landmen perform is
excepted from the unlicensed practice of law. Historically, the Ameri-
can Association of Professional Landmen (“AAPL”) has been influ-
ential in guaranteeing that this exception stays available to landmen
all over the United States and that landmen are not subject to licens-
ing requirements in the states they work in. In light of the recent, un-
successful attempt by the Texas legislature to regulate landmen, this
Article will analyze whether or not regulation would be beneficial for
landmen, the energy industry, and the general public.
This Article will first discuss the historical roots and qualities of
landmen. It will then address the duties and job functions of landmen.
Section III will analyze why both the general public and the energy
industry itself may distrust landmen and the job functions they per-
form. Section IV provides a contrast between landmen and the prac-
tice of law, in addition to identifying how the landman profession is
relatable to the real estate profession. These comparisons help high-
light the anomaly of the lack of regulation of landmen, even though
there are similarities among these professions. Section V addresses
the lack of regulation over landmen, including licensing theories, the
regulation of comparable professions, and the licensure requirements
proposed in Texas in 2009. Finally, Section VI presents examples of
what other states have done to promote regulation, summarizes other
regulatory recommendations, and ends by proposing regulations that
Texas could enact to regulate landmen.
II. LANDMAN
A. History of the Landman
“The landman may know the law, but the law does not seem to
know very much about the landman.”1 In fact, it seems that very little
is known about landmen and where the occupation began.2 Some
trace the occupational roots to buying timber rights in the 1800s or
securing coal rights in Appalachia.3 The role of the modern landman
has taken a somewhat similar, yet different, course since that time.4
When Texas struck “big time” oil with the Spindletop geyser in 1901,
endless opportunities for mineral wealth through development of oil
1. Gordon L. Allott, Jr., Unanticipated Liability of the Landman, 31 RMMLF-
INST 21, § 21.01 (1985).
2. See Ann M. Eisenburg, Land Shark at the Door? Why and How States Should
Regulate Landmen, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 165 (2016).
3. Id. at 165–67.
4. Id. at 165.
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fields in Texas seemed apparent.5 To bridge the gap between the min-
eral owner and the ambitious mineral developer, the industry needed
someone with kindness, loyalty, and the ability to create lasting trust
between the parties while, at the same time, securing the most
favorable lease possible for mineral developers.6 Success at this partic-
ular endeavor was quite lucrative.7 As such, today’s landmen are more
commonly associated with oil and gas companies, but their clientele
can be broadly defined as anyone interested in divesting or acquiring
mineral interests.8
Undoubtedly, the goal for buying or leasing timber lands in the
1800s was similar to the goal of leasing oil and gas rights today: get the
best deal for the client and leave a favorable impression for future
opportunities.9 Such a task could only be accomplished through “kind-
ness, loyalty, and trust.”10 In fact, a landman’s charisma can come
across as so endearing and sincere that a landowner feels guilty at-
tempting to negotiate a better deal.11
Up until 2007, landmen were a dying breed.12 Their job determining
mineral ownership and leasing mineral rights occurs in the early stages
in oil and gas exploration, so demand for landmen closely mirrors the
crude oil market.13 When the market regresses or crashes, landmen
are often left out of work.14 Domestic crude oil production declined
nearly every year from 1985 to 2007.15 U.S. oil production was under-
standably past its peak with no foreseeable rebound in production.16
“Landmen were not needed.”17
5. See Paul Cones, The Evolution of the American Landman, LANDMAN BLOG,
http://www.landmanblog.com/ evolution-american-landman/ [https://perma.cc/7NPF-
9Q7X] (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
6. See John McFarland, Dealing with Landmen, OIL & GAS LAWYER BLOG (Dec.
11, 2011), http://oilandgaslawyerblog.com/2011/12/dealing-with-landmen.html [https://
perma.cc/D4H2-UT2B].
7. Cones, supra note 5. The Texas Fuel Company was founded in 1902, and later
became known as Texaco. Id.
8. See Frequently Asked Questions, AAPL AMERICA’S LANDMEN, http://www
.americaslandman.com/faq [https://perma.cc/24N5-3RKM] (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
9. See Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 166.
10. Douglas Clark, Kindness, Loyalty and Trust; Enemies of the Landowner, but
Friends of the Landman, THE CLARK LAW FIRM, http://pagasleaseattorney.com/kind-
ness-loyalty-trust-enemies-landowner-friends-landman [https://perma.cc/3GGP-X27P]
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
11. Id.
12. Lauren Etter, Texas Landmen Left out of Work as Oil Patch Boom Turns
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But horizontal drilling and advances in fracing technology18 created
an energy boom that resurrected the landman profession.19 Horizontal
drilling coupled with regulatory spacing requirements meant that a
single lease was often not enough to meet the minimum acreage re-
quirement to drill a well.20 Urban areas, in particular, could require
hundreds of leases for a single oil or gas well.21 Exploration compa-
nies needed the landman to determine the proper owner of the miner-
als under each lot and to negotiate an oil and gas lease with each
individual owner. The result was, in a single five-year period coincid-
ing with the shale boom, an increase in AAPL membership from 8,000
to more than 20,000 members.22 By 2010, the average annual wage for
a landman was over $125,000.23 Shortly thereafter, CNN Money rec-
ognized the landman profession as one of the top 100 jobs in
America.24
The accolades were quickly met with equally unimpressed critics.25
During the shale boom, the increased interaction between landowners
and landmen increased scrutiny directed at landmen.26 Several articles
lambasting landmen for unethical and unscrupulous leasing practices
forced some states to consider regulating or licensing landmen,27
18. Cones, supra note 5.
19. Etter, supra note 12.
20. Cones, supra note 5.
21. See id.
22. Id. The AAPL currently has over 13,500 registered members and forty-four
local affiliated associations within the United States and Canada. Why Join?, AAPL
AMERICA’S LANDMEN, http://www.landman.org/aapl-membership/why-join (last vis-
ited Nov. 11, 2016). In addition to standard membership, the AAPL offers three levels
of certifications that landmen can obtain through a combination of work experience
and education. Id. The certifications improve credibility and have been proven to in-
crease the earning potential for landmen. Id. Throughout the oil and gas industry, the
certifications are recognized as indications of “competency, proficiency and profes-
sionalism.” Id. To set itself apart from other industry organizations, the AAPL offers
a multitude of education and networking opportunities to its members to help keep
them competitive and knowledgeable of changes in industry practices. Id. The educa-
tion materials vary in form, from continuing education courses focusing on contracts,
negotiations, and updates in oil and gas law, to publications like textbooks and re-
search articles. Id.
23. Cones, supra note 5.
24. Id. CNN Money bases the top 100 careers on “big growth, great pay and satis-
fying work.” 100 Best Jobs in America, CNN: MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/pf/best-
jobs/ [https://perma.cc/HC8H-U3P8] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
25. See, e.g., Eisenburg, supra note 2.
26. Id. at 161.
27. E.g., id. (stating that landmen have a reputation as ethically dubious and un-
scrupulous); see also Ian Urbina & Jo Craven McGinty, Learning Too Late of the
Perils in Gas Well Leases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/02/us/drilling-down-fighting-over-oil-and-gas-well-leases.html [https://perma.cc/
L7P2-V8WY] (claiming that landmen will tell people they will miss out if they do not
sign right away).
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likely in hopes of protecting landowners from being taken advantage
of by dishonest landmen.28
B. The Duties and Job Functions of a Landman
The landman, whether an independent landman or company
landman, is the business side of oil and gas exploration.29 While com-
pany landmen work directly, or in-house, for oil and gas companies,
independent landmen usually work on a contract basis for oil and gas
companies by performing research in the courthouse or acquiring
leases from mineral owners.30
Independent landmen generally establish the foundation for min-
eral ownership through courthouse research and serve as the indus-
try’s contact with the public.31 When an exploration company wants to
lease a tract of land, an independent landman performs research in
the county courthouse by searching the indirect index records and
tracing title back to a predetermined date, sometimes the date of the
land patent.32 After tracing the title back to the predetermined date,
the landman will run title forward by searching the direct index
records to check for mineral or other conveyances and active oil and
gas leases.33 If the title chain appears complete or acceptable, the
landman will calculate the present ownership interest of the tract of
land and prepare what is known as a mineral ownership report.34 The
mineral ownership report is then used by the landman, or a different
landman, to contact the appropriate mineral owners and attempt to
lease their undivided mineral interest through lease negotiations.35
After adequate leases are acquired to form a drillable unit, and the
exploration company decides it would like to drill a well, the indepen-
dent landman’s job is to return to the courthouse and complete a full-
title run sheet.36 The run sheet includes all documents that could af-
fect title to a particular tract of land.37 When the run sheet is com-
plete, it is submitted to an attorney for review.38 The attorney then
issues a title opinion that includes the ownership interests of all inter-
ested parties and possible curative issues that may need to be ad-
28. See Tex. H.B. 1405, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) for an example of legislation that
could be enacted to regulate landmen.
29. What is a Land Professional, AAPL, http://www.americaslandman.com/about-
landmen [https://perma.cc/P8J8-VMFQ] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
30. Rob Davis, A Landman’s Work is the Foundation for Accurately Determining
Mineral Ownership Under Rights-of-Way: So, How Should a Landman Search for
Roadway Title?, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 39, 42–44 (2011).
31. What is a Professional Landman, supra note 29, at 42.
32. Davis, supra note 30, at 42–43, 50–51.
33. Id. at 50–51.
34. Id. at 41–42.
35. Id. at 40–44.
36. Id. at 43.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 42.
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dressed to correct title defects.39 Throughout this process, the
company landman acts as the supervisor of the independent landmen
and attorneys involved40 and relies on the title foundation set by the
independent landmen.41  The company landman requests run sheets
from the independent landman and title opinions from attorneys, de-
cides what title risks the drilling company is willing to take, and deter-
mines what curative instruments are absolutely necessary to clear
title.42
However, the duties of a landman are not limited to these func-
tions.43 Landmen can perform multiple other functions, including, but
not limited to, negotiating business agreements for mineral explora-
tion and managing mineral rights or obligations derived from owner-
ship of mineral interests.44 In sum, a landman is “primarily responsible
for the acquisition and management of interests in oil, gas, and all
other mineral estates in land.”45
III. REASONS FOR MISTRUSTED LANDMEN
Motivated by fear of missing out on lease bonus money and
monthly royalty checks, early signers of oil and gas leases are often
not concerned with whether they got a good deal.46 The difference
between a good lease and a bad lease can be a substantial amount of
money.47 Early in the Barnett Shale boom, leases in Tarrant County,
Texas, offered $300 to $400 per residential lot, and a royalty between
12.5% and 18.5%.48 Not long thereafter, Tarrant County residents
were receiving offers as high as $18,250 per acre with a 27.5% roy-
alty.49 Landowners, when envious of their neighbor’s better deal,
often blame landmen, claiming they were misled during the negotia-
tion process.50 But the better deals were likely due to landowners
gaining knowledge about the lease negotiation process and neutraliz-
39. Id. at 41–45. Curative is the process used to fix any defects in the title chain for
a certain tract of land. Title Curative, MINERAL WISE, http://www.mineralweb.com/
library/oil-and-gas-terms/title-curative-definition/ [https://perma.cc/5CV9-KM7H]
(last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
40. Davis, supra note 30, at 45–46.
41. Id. at 46.
42. Id. at 45–46.
43. See Memorandum from Dr. Virkram Rao, Chairman of the N.C. Mining &
Energy Comm’n to the Envtl. Review Comm’n at 2 (Apr. 1, 2015) (on file with the
N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res.).
44. Id.
45. Rodney D. Knutson, Legal and Ethical Obligations a Landman Owes His Em-
ployer, 31 RMMLF-INST 19, § 19.01 (1985).
46. J. Zach Burt, Playing the “Wild Card” in the High-Stakes Game of Urban
Drilling: Unconscionability in the Early Barnett Shale Gas Leases, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 1, 4 (2008).
47. Id. at 3–4.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
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ing hard lease tactics by organizing their neighborhoods and waiting
until the competition for their minerals heated up.51
A. The Negotiation between Landman and Landowner
Landmen that become members of the AAPL agree to abide by a
certain Code of Ethics.52 That code provides: “the Land Professional,
in his dealings with landowners . . . shall conduct himself in a manner
consistent with fairness and honesty, such as to maintain the respect of
the public.”53 A landman involved in lease acquisitions must also “be
sensitive to his obligations to disclose certain information to those
with whom he bargains.”54 A landman who keeps silent as to material
facts could be liable for fraud if:
(1) the ignorant party makes inquiry as to the existence of such
facts;
(2) the knowledgeable party makes a partial disclosure which is
misleading unless full disclosure is made;
(3) a previously made innocent representation will be misleading
unless subsequently acquired information is disclosed;
(4) the parties occupy a fiduciary or other confidential relationship;
or
(5) the contract is inequitable, and the facts would not have been
accessible to the ignorant party upon reasonable investigation.55
However, circumstances surrounding negotiations for oil and gas
leases are, perhaps, the greatest area of criticism placed on profes-
sional landmen.56  In recent years, “Americans have signed millions of
leases” with energy companies allowing for the exploration of oil or
gas on their property.57 Many of these landowners, excited by the
lease bonus money, fail to inquire or further understand what the lan-
guage and long-term effects of the lease entail.58 Oil and gas are re-
garded as a fee interest estate in land.59 A conveyance, reservation, or
oil and gas lease can sever that interest from the surface estate.60 An
oil and gas lease operates as a “conveyance that transfers a fee simple
determinable interest in the mineral estate that is subject to the terms
51. Burt, supra note 46, at 3–4.
52. See Code of Ethics, AAPL, http://www.landman.org/about-aapl/bylaws [https:/
/perma.cc/43TP-7L2] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Code of Ethics].
53. Id.
54. Knutson, supra note 45, at § 19.03(6).
55. Id.
56. E.g., Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27; Colby Hamilton, The Landmen
Cometh, EMPIRE (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/story/194971-the-landmen-
cometh/ [https://perma.cc/8CEJ-KUXJ].
57. Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
58. Id.
59. Orca Assets, G.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 05-13-01700-CV, 2015
WL 4736786, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. filed).
60. Id.
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of the lease.”61 The lease, if a producing well is drilled, could be the
beginning of a relationship that affects the quality of living for land-
owners for several decades.62
The U.S. shale boom increased landman interactions with the gen-
eral public and exposed the rest of the U.S. to some of the unscrupu-
lous leasing practices that had existed for several decades in the
landman profession.63 The problem, however, is likely two-fold: the
landman does whatever it takes to get a lease, and the landowner fails
to understand the lease and the realities implicated by oil and gas
exploration.64
1. Lease Tactics Used by Landmen
Aggressive lease tactics used by landmen may compel some people
to compare landmen to used car salesmen.65 A comparison of the two
invokes allegations that landmen serve up “half-truths, misrepresenta-
tions, or outright lies.”66 The allegations may be well-founded, how-
ever, in light of Ohio’s recent investigation into a possible document
that taught landmen how to lie to homeowners to secure valuable oil
and gas leases.67 But landmen commonly dismiss these complaints,
claiming they are not intentionally deceitful in lease negotiations, and
instead, proposing that complaints usually come from landowners that
“are envious about the amount of money they believe their neighbors
are earning in bonuses and royalty.”68
But the complaints are difficult to dismiss, especially when legal
scholars discuss them in detail69 and news agencies publish articles al-
leging the same practices.70 After all, if landowners have not seen a
good lease or negotiated with a landman before, how are they sup-
posed to know what to ask for?71 Allegations concerning landmen
often claim use of “coercion, threats, and forceful behavior” to obtain
leases.72 Some landmen carry maps with every tract of land colored in
except for one, claiming that an individual owner was holding up the
61. Id.
62. Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27 (stating that a gas well could produce for
decades).
63. See Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 171–77.
64. McFarland, supra note 6; see also Burt, supra note 46.




68. Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
69. See, e.g., Eisenburg, supra note 2.
70. E.g., Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
71. Id.
72. Allison Sickle, Congressman Denies Knowing His Wife Lobbied For Landman
Group, NAT. GAS FORUM FOR LANDOWNERS (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.naturalgas-
forums.com/smf/index.php?topic=6442.0 [https://perma.cc/V4MR-M6SX].
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process for everyone.73 Then they repeat the process with the neigh-
bor using a different map.74 Hard-sales tactics are used, such as
“We’re only in town until tomorrow,” or “We have already signed up
all your neighbors.”75 Some landmen assert that landowners who do
not lease right away will miss out on easy money, and the oil and gas
company will take their minerals without paying for them.76
2. The Knowledge Gap Between Landmen and Landowners
Perhaps the underlying issue in lease negotiations is the knowledge
disparity between landmen and landowners.77 The knowledge of land-
men is not in and of itself the problem. Instead, the lack of knowledge
possessed by landowners is often what contributes to feelings of un-
fairness and unconscionability.78 After all, “[t]here has to be igno-
rance to prey on.”79
Landowners commonly misunderstand language in a lease, such as
what constitutes drilling operations.80 Even attorneys not well-versed
in oil and gas lack an understanding of the terms included in an oil
and gas lease.81 A lack of understanding subsequently leaves landown-
ers unable to negotiate a better deal and often leaves them unaware of
the long-term effects of an oil and gas lease.82 Landowners’ inability
to properly negotiate leases overwhelmingly favors energy
companies.83
In 2011, the New York Times reviewed over 111,000 oil and gas
leases (mostly from Texas) and realized that most leases allowed for
broad development rights, tree removal, chemical storage, and other
surface changes to the property leased.84 Not surprisingly, the leases
rarely mentioned any environmental problems that could arise from
drilling operations.85 Adding insult to injury, few consumer protection
laws apply to oil and gas leases to protect landowners after signing a
lease.86 The consequences of a bad lease vary widely, including the
possibility of spending hundreds of dollars to purchase drinking water
when the water well relied upon for drinking water becomes contami-
nated as a result of nearby drilling operations.87 The truth is, a “gaping
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
76. Id.
77. Burt, supra note 46, at 4.
78. Id.
79. Hamilton, supra note 65.
80. Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
81. Burt, supra note 46, at 3.
82. Id. at 3–4.
83. See id.
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inequality” exists between the knowledge and negotiation skills of the
average landman and the average landowner contemplating signing an
oil and gas lease.88
Past landowners that have already been victimized by poor leases
warn future lessors to get educated before the landman comes knock-
ing.89 A knowledgeable landowner can likely circumvent hard sales
tactics used by landmen that fall outside the accepted general profes-
sional standards.90 Questions including what company the landman
works for, why the company is leasing in the area, what kind of wells
will be drilled, and how much acreage the company has acquired in
the area are all a good start.91 But answers to those questions are of
little value if the landowner does not take it a step further and per-
form the proper due diligence by understanding the lease, investigat-
ing state and local laws, and researching oil and gas production in the
area.92 Perhaps, most important is “don’t get in a hurry,” because in-
stilling a fear that the opportunity will pass and the landowner will be
the only one left out is one of the landman’s strongest tactics.93 But as
ignorance among landowners disappears, unethical landmen will find
themselves in a tougher position.94
B. Opportunistic Landmen and the Agency Relationship
“The landman is an agent of his employer.”95 Thus, the law of
agency likely applies to landmen.96 As an agent, the landman has “a
duty not to take advantage of confidential information acquired in his
position of agency that would detrimentally affect the principal in the
relationship.”97 He is “bound to exercise the utmost good faith, loy-
alty, and honesty toward his employer” and “must use care, skill, and
diligence in performing his duties.”98 After all, landmen often possess
proprietary information on “unleased prospects, prospects that are
currently in the leasing process, and unleased minerals in existing
wells.”99 The volatility of the energy industry often leads landmen to
88. Id.
89. Id.




94. Hamilton, supra note 65.
95. Knutson, supra note 45, at § 19.02(1).
96. S. Thomas Throne & Jacob T. Haseman, The Duty of Landmen and Legal
Counsel to Former Employers in the Petroleum Industry: Ethical and Legal Obliga-
tions, 55 RMMLF-INST 7-1, § 7.02 (2009). The principal-agent relationship depends
on three elements: “the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him,
the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking; and the understanding of the parties that
the principal is to be in control of the undertaking.” Id. at § 7.02(1).
97. Id.
98. Knutson, supra note 45, at § 19.02(1).
99. Thorne & Haseman, supra note 96, at § 7.01.
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pursue other opportunities that can sometimes offer a higher salary.100
Therefore, they often end up working for “direct competitors of their
former employers.”101
The AAPL’s voluntary code of ethics specifically addresses the duty
that a land professional owes to employers.102 “A Land Professional
shall not betray a partner’s, employee’s, or client’s trust by directly
turning confidential information to personal gain.”103 As a remedy,
“any profit gained from improper use of confidential information . . .
in violation of his fiduciary duty before or after termination of the
agency relationship must be returned to the principal.”104
Examples in case law can help people understand the importance of
this code of ethics.105 In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, an oil company
sued its former landman, Joiner, to recover for damages for fraudu-
lently mishandling information when Joiner obtained leases for his
own use and benefit.106 Tenneco hired Joiner to secure leases within a
certain area outline on Tenneco’s buy map.107 Joiner worked for Ten-
neco for four months, securing leases within the outlined area before
his contract with Tenneco was terminated.108 Nevertheless, Joiner ob-
tained thirty leases for himself, resulting in substantial damages to
Tenneco.109 The court held that Joiner misused confidential informa-
tion that he had acquired from Tenneco for personal gain.110 Tenneco
is not the lone example of a landman misusing confidential informa-
tion. In Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Willis, the court held that Willis, a
landman, misused confidential information when he obtained leases in
the target area under the name of his brother-in-law at a substantial
profit to himself.111
The agency relationship can also cause substantial liability concerns
for an oil company that employs a problematic landman. In Pe-
trohawk Properties, L.P. v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P., Petrohawk
found itself on the unfavorable end of the court’s decision due to
fraud and misrepresentations by one of the landmen representing it.112
Petrohawk’s landman, Lisa Broomfield, approached a property owner
after Chesapeake had already secured a lease extension with the same
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Code of Ethics, supra note 52.
103. Id.
104. Thorne & Haseman, supra note 96, at § 7.02(2).
105. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1982).
106. Id. at 769.
107. Id. at 770.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 776.
111. See Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Willis, 152 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1946).
112. See Petrohawk Props., L.P. v. Chesapeake La., L.P., 689 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.
2012).
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property owner.113 Broomfield informed the property owners that
Louisiana was a race statute state, which could potentially invalidate
the Chesapeake lease if Petrohawk filed the lease before Chesapeake
filed a lease extension.114 The court held that Broomfield’s statements
were material misrepresentations of fact that constituted fraud, and
thereby rescinded the initial lease between Petrohawk and the
landowners.115
A simple analysis of this agency relationship clearly establishes that
a typical landman has no interest in helping a landowner obtain a
lease with favorable landowner provisions.116 When leasing for an oil
and gas company, a landman’s loyalty lies solely with the oil and gas
company, not with the landowner considering the proposed oil and
gas lease.117 In fact, when landmen misrepresent facts or the law, or
fraudulently induce landowners into leasing, it is often the oil and gas
company that suffers the most because of this agency relationship.118
IV. COMPARABLE PROFESSIONS TO THE PROFESSIONAL LANDMAN
A. Landmen and the Unlicensed Practice of Law
A landman’s job necessarily includes the interpretation and prepa-
ration of legal documents relating to real property.119 It requires a vast
understanding of mineral law and contract law.120 Additionally, nego-
tiations for mineral rights expose landmen to the possibility of mis-
leading legal representations.121 Mix in the realization that a single
transaction or lease could be worth millions of dollars, and it is easy to
see why the landman profession is at the receiving end of much
scrutiny.122
In Texas, the preparation of instruments affecting title to real prop-
erty constitutes the practice of law.123 The practice of law also includes
legal advice given to a client as to the interpretation of certain facts.124
Even though negotiating a lease may not raise many problems, land-
113. Id. at 384.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 389–92.
116. See Knutson, supra note 45; see also Code of Ethics, supra note 52.
117. See Knutson, supra note 45.
118. E.g., Petrohawk Props., L.P. v. Chesapeake La., L.P., 689 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.
2012).
119. Brian R. Bjella, Are Landmen Practicing the Law? The Legal and Ethical Is-
sues, 9 RMMLF-INST 25, § 25.01 (2003).
120. Id.
121. John S. Dzienkowski, Unauthorized Practice of Law: Potential Traps for Law-
yers and Landmen, 40C RMMLF-INST 13, III.A. (1996).
122. See Orca Assets, G.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 05-13-01700-CV,
2015 WL 4736786 at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. filed).
123. J. Alton Alsup, Preparation of Documentation Affecting Title to Texas Real
Property as the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 475, 478
(2007).
124. Dzienkowski, supra note 121, at II.B.
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men in that position may find themselves drafting lease clauses or fill-
ing in lease provisions, which could be considered the unlicensed
practice of law.125 Because securing a lease often demands a trust rela-
tionship with the landowner, landmen in lease negotiations may instill
a belief in the landowner that the landman is a disinterested party.126
Answering questions or giving legal interpretations of lease provisions
to the landowner may even lead landowners to believe that the
landman is their personal counsel.127
Landmen in the courthouse performing title work straddle a similar
line.128 Courthouse research of title is not the practice of law; in fact,
nearly anyone can do it.129 However, a written report, such as a min-
eral ownership report, that includes an analysis and conclusions of
ownership interest could be considered the practice of law.130 It is true
that a title attorney reviews many of these documents prior to drilling,
but the title attorney rarely steps foot in the courthouse, especially
during a “sit down” title examination.131 It is the landman that
searches the records—hopefully thoroughly, determines whether the
document affects the subject lands, and includes those documents in
the run sheet for an attorney to review.132
But, in Texas, landmen fulfilling their usual job functions do not
have to worry much about the unlicensed practice of law.133 Many of a
landman’s job functions are specifically excluded by statute from the
unauthorized practice of law.134 The statute excludes “a person per-
forming acts relating to a transaction for the lease, sale, or transfer of
any mineral or mining interest in real property” from the unlicensed
practice of law.135
Even with this exception, many landmen still pursue a legal educa-
tion and ultimately become licensed attorneys.136 Legal education “is
recognized by many as excellent training for a landman.”137 Coinci-
dentally, a landman with a law degree could receive additional com-
pensation because of the advanced degree.138






131. Davis, supra note 30, at 44.
132. Id. at 43.
133. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 83.001(b) (2013).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Knutson, supra note 45, at § 19.03[5][a].
137. Id.; see, e.g., Landnews, AAPL, http://aaplconnect.landman.org/communities/
community-home/digestviewer/viewthread?GroupId=25&MID=1597&tab=digest
viewer&CommunityKey=782d4397-8f47-4fd1-9440-47b81437922a&ssopc=1 [https://
perma.cc/R3A3-2RV5] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (showing that many job postings for
landmen prefer applicants with a J.D.).
138. Knutson, supra note 45, at § 19.03[5][a].
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A landman that becomes an attorney must consider “special restric-
tions on whether or not he holds himself as a lawyer.”139 Although
becoming a lawyer has many benefits, it also subjects a landman to
disciplinary rules. Rule 8.4(c) of the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that it is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”140 Regardless of whether
the landman chooses to hold himself out as a lawyer, the ABA has
made it clear that a lawyer is bound by the applicable disciplinary
rules, regardless of whether he is acting in his professional capacity as
a lawyer.141 Therefore, a landman wishing to identify as a lawyer may
do so to achieve recognition, but should do so with extreme
caution.142
B. Comparison with Real Estate Professionals
The landman’s role, though somewhat of a reversal, can be com-
pared to that of a real estate agent representing a party in a real estate
transaction.143 While the real estate agent persuades someone to
purchase real estate, the landman attempts to purchase an oil and gas
lease from someone that owns the minerals under real estate.144 Both
the landman and the real estate agent are charged with filling out the
paperwork to make the transaction official, and both play the role of
the negotiator. And, like landmen, real estate professionals are also
excepted from the unauthorized practice of law by Texas statute.145
However, unlike landmen, real estate professionals in every state
must take a basic real estate course that requires several classroom
hours to be able to practice.146 Surprisingly, Texas has some of the
most stringent requirements, including 210 education hours to become
a real estate agent and 630 additional education hours to become a
real estate broker.147 Additional requirements include a licensing
exam and the payment of all necessary fees.148 These requirements
serve a double purpose: proof that the agent is competent about the
real estate process and issuance of a license that the state can revoke if
the agent is dishonest.149
139. Id.
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (2016).
141. Knutson, supra note 45, at § 19.03[5][a].
142. See id.
143. Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 190.
144. Id.
145. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 83.001(b) (2013).
146. Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 188–89.
147. Evgeny S. Vorotnikov, License to Profit: An Analysis of Entry Regulations in
the Legal and Real Estate Professions, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 52, 60
(2011).
148. Id.
149. Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 189.
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Originally, real estate agents represented the seller in a real estate
transaction under an agreement in which the agent received a com-
mission for a successful sale.150 But real estate agents blurred this rela-
tionship with the seller as the industry expanded.151 Eventually, the
agent took on a central role in the real estate transaction, appearing to
represent both the buyer and the seller.152 The appearance of this cen-
tral role exposed the seller to possible vicarious liability for the agent’s
actions and sometimes misled buyers into believing that the agent ac-
tually represented them.153 This confusion was the result of “very little
standardization in licensing and agency rules regulating realtors.”154
The lack of agency rules and licensing standards for realtors parallel
mistrust of landmen today. With very few exceptions, landmen are left
unlicensed, unregulated, and undefined in the role they play interact-
ing with the public to acquire leases.155 A landman that cozies up with
a mineral owner to get a lease appears to play the same central role in
a negotiation that caused a conflict of interest for realtors.156 The only
difference is that the late twentieth century brought licensing statutes
requiring education, training, and various types of disclosure aimed at
“heightening realtor accountability to parties with whom they trans-
act.”157 Despite cries from the public and legal scholars,158 no such
action has been taken to heighten the accountability of landmen in
Texas.
V. LACK OF REGULATION ANOMALY
In at least one U.S. state, more than eight hundred occupations re-
quire licensure.159 Occupational licensing has grown tremendously
over the last fifty years and, by 2008, was estimated to affect 29% of
the workforce through federal, state, or local governments.160 One
study suggests that higher educated workers are likely to work in oc-
cupations that require a license.161 It is understandable then that li-






155. Id. at 160.
156. Id. at 192.
157. Id. at 189–90. Many states require real estate agents to disclose exactly what
their role is in the transaction. Id.
158. See id. at 157–206; see also Urbina & McGinty, supra note 27.
159. Mario Pagliero, What is the object of professional licensing? Evidence from the
US market for lawyers, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 473, 473 (2011).
160. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupa-
tional Licensing 1, 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14308, 2008).
161. Id. at 2. Licensing is also more prevalent among minorities, union members,
and government workers. Id.
162. Id.
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A. Regulatory Background on Comparable Occupations
and Licensing Theories
Two prevalent theories of licensing exist; the public interest theory
and the capture theory.163 The public interest theory suggests that li-
censing imposes a minimum quality standard to ensure the “quality of
goods or services provided to the public by eliminating dishonest prac-
titioners and charlatans from the market.”164 Many articles that attack
landmen for unethical practices mirror the public interest theory.165
Hence, the public interest theory presents the idea that licensing
would allow the state to keep track of landmen that are accused of
misrepresentation or fraud, and create a way to remove them from the
industry.166
The capture theory, on the other hand, argues that the industry it-
self creates, designs, and operates the regulation primarily for its own
benefit.167 The capture theory may be what truly drove the boom of
licensing since the 1950s.168 Licensing can help eliminate unwanted
competition in a labor market, resulting in an increase in salary of
around 15%.169 The licensing board basically serves as the gatekeeper,
adjusting the licensing requirements to keep new competition out of
the market.170
1. Entry Regulations of Lawyers
Some studies indicate that the capture theory may be applicable to
the education and entry requirements that regulate who may become
a lawyer.171 Barriers to entry for attorneys coincided with the creation
of the ABA in 1878.172 The ABA, throughout its history, has been
“actively interested in improving the legal profession through legal ed-
ucation.”173 By 1952, the ABA was acknowledged as the national
agency for law school accreditation.174
163. Pagliero, supra note 159, at 473.
164. Vorotnikov, supra note 147, at 52.
165. E.g., Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 198–99.
166. Id. at 200–02.
167. Pagliero, supra note 159, at 473.
168. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 160.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Vorotnikov, supra note 147, at 54; Robert W. Hahn, Robert E. Litan, & Jesse
Gurman, Bring More Competition to Real Estate Brokerage, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 86, 100
(2006).
171. Vorotnikov, supra note 147, at 52–66.
172. Id. at 53.
173. Id. at 53–54. First, law schools required a high school diploma, then two years
of college, then, in 1948, the first LSAT was administered to help law schools search
for skillful candidates. Id. at 54.
174. Id. at 55. As the ABA became more influential, the number of non-accredited
law schools saw a sharp decline in both number and student enrollment. Id. By 1982,
only one percent of law students were enrolled in unapproved schools, leading to
accusations that the ABA “inflated faculty salaries, reduced teaching loads, increased
the cost of legal education, and prevented disadvantaged persons from obtaining legal
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In 1972, an affiliate of the ABA introduced the Multistate Bar Ex-
amination for the first time.175 The Multistate Professional Responsi-
bility Examination followed in 1980.176 In 1988 the Multistate Essay
Examination was introduced, and in 1997 the Multistate Performance
Test began.177 Given these historical events and others, it appears that
the legal profession has been introducing barriers to entry “that have
grown and tightened” over the years.178
2. Entry Regulations of Real Estate Professionals
The occupation licensure of real estate professionals has a long his-
tory as well.179 It began in the late 1800s when local real estate boards
pushed for fees and bond requirements to receive a real estate license
in hopes of eliminating “curbstoners from the market.”180 The Na-
tional Association of Realtors (“NAR”) was founded in 1908, and in
1913 the NAR proposed that every state adopt regulatory licensing
requirements.181 At the time, “some real estate professionals saw li-
censing as a threat to their profession, and others claimed it would be
inefficient in excluding charlatans.”182 Despite the controversy, every
state has some form of real estate licensing today.183
3. The Argument Against Excessive Entry Regulations
One of the main reasons many researchers do not support occupa-
tional licensing is because licensing regulations are often lobbied for
by the professionals or their affiliated lobby organizations: the ABA
did it for the legal profession, and the NAR did it for the real estate
professions.184 The effect of the regulation is a reduction in competi-
tion instead of protection for the consumers from incompetent profes-
sionals.185 The reduction in competition allows professionals to charge
higher fees and leaves few incentives for improving the quality of
service.186
education.” Id. at 56. The US Department of Justice further alleged that the ABA had




177. Id. at 57.
178. Id. at 58.
179. Id. at 58–60.
180. Id. at 58.
181. Id. at 58–59.
182. Id. at 59.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 62.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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However, not all occupational licensing has this unfortunate conse-
quence, whether intended or unintended.187 “The main justification
for the existence of mandatory licensure . . . is that professionals can
cause damages that are hard to estimate in monetary terms in order to
properly compensate victims, or irreversible damages that are impos-
sible to compensate.”188 But in cases outside of these particular dam-
age claims, the public is already protected from fraud, professional
negligence, and other damages by means of existing laws and a proper
court system.189 However, rural areas, where most oil and gas explora-
tion occurs, may have limited accessibility to these common law legal
solutions.190
B. Texas’s Most Recent Attempt to Regulate Landmen
In 2009, State Representative Charlie Geren sponsored a bill aimed
at requiring landman licensing in Texas.191 The purpose of the propo-
sal was “to protect the public” from landmen, defining a landman as
“a person that acquires or manages mineral interest, performs title or
contract functions related to the exploration of minerals, negotiates
for the acquisition or divestiture of minerals, or negotiates business
agreements that provide for the exploration for or development of
minerals.”192 The bill further proposed that no person may perform
the functions of a landman unless that person applied for and held a
landman license issued by the Texas Real Estate Commission
(“TREC”).193
Notably, the bill attempted to give TREC a great amount of discre-
tion.194 The bill allowed TREC to establish education, experience, and
examination requirements; moral character requirements like hon-
esty, trustworthiness, and integrity; continuing education require-
ments; the scope of practice by landmen; and the code of conduct and
ethics.195 Additionally, the bill allowed TREC to set fees, establish the
term of the license, and determine disciplinary rules for violations.196
Why the bill delegated this authority to TREC is unclear,197 espe-
cially when the AAPL seems like the natural choice given its estab-
187. See id. at 63 (referencing at study that shows licensing increased the quality of
service based on the number of complaints filed against real estate agents).
188. Id. at 62.
189. Id.
190. Eisenburg, supra note 2, at 198.









197. See H.B. 1405, supra note 191.
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lished relationship with the landman profession.198 It could be due to
the AAPL’s stance against working with the state to develop a licens-
ing bill in Texas at the time,199 or perhaps the extensive experience of
TREC in regulatory matters.200 Ultimately, the bill was met with little
regard. After its first reading, the bill stalled in the Licensing and Ad-
ministrative Procedures Committee in March 2009.201
C. The Influence Behind the Decision in Texas
The AAPL took a hard-defensive position against Rep. Geren’s
landman licensing requirements in Texas.202 The Houston Association
of Professional Landmen (“HAPL”), an associate group of the
AAPL, published a release stating it believed “Mr. Charles Geren’s
bill [was] a real threat to [the] profession.”203 The release indicated
that HAPL visited with staff lobbyists from several large oil compa-
nies, the Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners, the Texas
Oil & Gas Association, members of TREC, and several independent
lobbyists.204 HAPL’s position was a reflection of its members’ ex-
pressed opposition to licensing, “let alone licensing under TREC,” ad-
ditionally noting that it would potentially seek help from its members
to oppose passage of the bill.205
Circumstances surrounding the licensing bill could be what led the
industry to oppose it so strongly. The bill called for licensing to occur
under TREC, an organization that previously had little relation to the
landman profession.206 Market conditions were also likely an influen-
tial indicator that many associations in the industry considered.207 The
U.S. was in the midst of the largest energy boom it had seen since the
1980s.208 In 2008, both oil and gas prices were near historical highs.209
198. Why Join?, supra note 22.
199. Motion Passed at December 2008 AAPL Board Meeting, TAPL (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.tapl.org/articles/motion-passed-at-december-2008-aapl-board-meeting
[https://perma.cc/2JZA-LLNK] [hereinafter Motion Passed].
200. About TREC, TEX. REAL ESTATE COMM’N, https://www.trec.texas.gov/agen
cy-information/about-trec [https://perma.cc/2N37-SUQZ] (last visited Oct. 3, 2017)
(stating that TREC has served to safeguard consumers in real property transactions
since 1949).
201. H.B. 1405, supra note 191 (showing online that the last action on the bill was a
referral to the Licensing and Administrative Procedures Committee on March 2,
2009).
202. Motion Passed, supra note 199.




206. See About TREC, supra note 200, at 2 (stating that TREC offers licensing for
real estate agents, brokers, inspectors, right-of-way agents, and residential service
companies, but does not offer any license for a landmen).
207. See Crude Oil, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/commod-
ity/crude-oil [https://perma.cc/TA99-6FH4] (click “All” below the chart) (last visited
Oct. 1, 2017).
208. Etter, supra note 12.
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Despite a dip in the market, oil prices were headed back to over $100
per barrel.210 Landmen were in extremely high demand.211 This Au-
thor believes that mandating licensure at this time could have left ex-
ploration companies shorthanded and unable to lease the acreage
needed to drill and increase domestic energy production. Under the
capture theory, licensed landmen—in high demand and limited in sup-
ply—would have been able to demand higher prices,212 a cost that
would be placed directly on the oil and gas companies, and, ulti-
mately, transferred to the end consumer.
If the reader here believes that the capture theory for licensing is
prevalent and the most common reason for regulating a profession, it
may come as a surprise that landmen and the AAPL opposed licens-
ing as strongly as they did. By placing some form of entry barrier on
the occupation, landman licensing may offer some form of stability to
an incredibly volatile and expendable profession. Furthermore, by
eliminating some of the unscrupulous landmen, the honest landman
may be able to regain the trust of the public.213 The potential increase
in pay would probably be a welcomed side effect.214
VI. REGULATORY OPTIONS AVAILABLE
A. States That Took Action to Reign in Leasing Practices
Few states have successfully taken action to regulate landmen.215 In
2015, none of the thirty-four states active in oil and gas production
activities required formal landman registration.216 However, in some
states, the conduct of landmen may be included in the definition of
real estate agents.217 In fact, only two states have a statutory require-
ment for landman registration: Maryland and North Carolina.218 Ma-
ryland’s registration requirement is rather simple: submit an
209. Crude Oil, supra note 207; Natural Gas, TRADING ECON., http://www.trad-
ingeconomics.com/commodity/natural-gas [https://perma.cc/WMD7-NKZ4] (click
“All” below the chart) (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
210. Crude Oil, supra note 207.
211. Etter, supra note 12.
212. See Vorotnikov, supra note 147, at 62 (stating as it becomes more complicated
to enter a profession, the number of professionals remains the same or decreases,
allowing the remaining professionals to charge higher fees).
213. Hamilton, supra note 65.
214. Klein & Krueger, supra note 160, at 8 (stating that occupational licensing has a
15% positive impact on wages).
215. Memorandum from Dr. Virkram Rao, supra note 43, at 4.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10.5-102 (Supp. 2016); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113-425(b) (2016). In Maryland, “[a] person may not operate as a land profes-
sional in the State unless the person registers . . . and is issued a registration certifi-
cate.” MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10.5-102. North Carolina’s statute says
that “a person may not act, or hold oneself out as a landman . . . unless the person is
registered. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113.425(b).
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application and pay the fee.219 Upon approval, the landman is regis-
tered for two years, after which time he must reapply.220 North Caro-
lina’s registration, enforced by the Department of Environmental
Quality, is strikingly similar.221
Unfortunately, neither state requires much more than a very simple
application for registration approval.222 Such a baseless standard for
registration likely provides a false sense of security to landowners
when dealing with registered landmen,223 which is why Texas needs to
consider a more comprehensive approach that stipulates additional re-
quirements beyond a simple registration process.
B. Scholarly Suggested Approaches to Regulation
The fact that the oil and gas lease is viewed as a contract between
two parties leaves the mineral owner the option to claim damages
under several common-law remedies including misrepresentation,
fraud, and even unconscionability. But these remedies are generally
only available after damages have been suffered and “may be of lim-
ited accessibility to many rural residents anyway.”224
Apart from common law remedies, states hoping to achieve some
oversight of the landman profession could implement other regulatory
options.225 Among these are landman registration and licensing, dis-
closure requirements, ethical standards, misdemeanor convictions and
civil fines, lease revocation rights by landowners, and vicarious liabil-
ity through presumed agency relationships.226 Registration and licens-
ing are probably the logical first step because they act as barriers to
entry and allow for disciplinary oversight.227 Essentially, “the require-
ment of passing an exam will . . . [weed] out the ‘unscrupulous.’”228
Registration or licensing through an exam could be supplemented
with an array of disclosure requirements.229 Disclosures such as re-
quiring landmen to present identification and proof of a license and
219. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10.5-103(a).
220. § 10.5-103(c).
221. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-425(b).
222. See Landman Registry Application, N.C. DEP’T ENV’T & NAT. RES., http://
www.conservation.nc.gov/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=7738e949-98e6-4191-b78
b-60cfeb293563&groupId=14 [https://perma.cc/DGF8-BXJA] (last visited Feb. 19,
2017); see also Apply for an Original Registration – Maryland Oil and Gas Land Pro-
fessionals, MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION, http://www.dllr.state
.md.us/license/oilgas/ogapply.shtml [https://perma.cc/W6J9-GBEH] (following hyper-
link: “Register as a Maryland Oil and Gas Land Professional”) (last visited Oct. 4,
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acknowledge the existence of an agency relationship with the com-
pany they represent could be beneficial.230 This would serve as a pro-
tective measure to notify the land or mineral owner that the landman
does not represent his or her interest.231 Additional disclosures in-
clude the “environmental aspects of proposed development[ ] and the
financial details of any proposed deal.”232 To be certain all disclosures
were properly made, a disclosure checklist signed by the landowner
could serve as evidence that the landman has acted in good faith and
has not withheld material information.233
Along with mandatory disclosure, imposition of misdemeanor con-
victions for acts of fraud or intimidation could help protect landown-
ers.234 But the idea of protecting the public may be better served with
a landowner right of revocation.235 A right of revocation would allow
a landowner who signed prematurely to collect more facts, consult
with an attorney, and potentially withdraw or renegotiate the lease
upon the realization that the lease terms were undesirable or misrep-
resented.236 The regulation model applied to real estate agents is rec-
ommended as the best way to implement these suggestions.237
C. A Possible Approach Through the AAPL
The real estate model may be an excellent proposition; however,
great potential lies in the infrastructure and network currently main-
tained by the AAPL. Similar to the way the ABA established regula-
tions for attorneys and the NAR imposed early regulations on real
estate professionals,238 the AAPL—the landman professionals them-
selves—should devise regulations that will protect the landman pro-
fession from “curbstoners.”239
Given the already established complexity of the AAPL,240 and the
fact that it privately regulates its voluntary members for ethical viola-
tions,241 dismissing the AAPL as a means of regulating landmen al-
most seems illogical.242 Perhaps, then, the best way to accomplish
what Representative Geren set out to do—protect the public—could
best be accomplished with the AAPL acting as an agent for the state
instead of placing that burden on TREC. The AAPL, through hand-
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outs or its website, could provide information to landowners, such as
disclosures about oil and gas exploration or a code of conduct that
landowners should expect from landmen. Landmen would then only
need to provide an informational sheet about the AAPL to landown-
ers. Failure to do so could result in an opportunity for the landowner
to revoke or renegotiate a lease. Provided with the AAPL information
sheet, failure by landowners to contact the AAPL or visit the AAPL
website and educate themselves on oil and gas activities could be
viewed as willful blindness.
If done correctly, the AAPL could accomplish many of the other
scholarly regulatory recommendations, including mandatory licensure,
disclosure requirements, and landowner revocation. Appropriate reg-
ulatory requirements would force landmen to become more educated
about oil and gas and more knowledgeable about the circumstances
surrounding negotiations with landowners. All parties involved, in-
cluding landmen, oil and gas companies, and landowners negotiating
with landmen, would benefit from using an organization with immedi-
ate presence, vast educational abilities, an established Code of Ethics,
and members that have agreed to abide by that Code of Ethics.
One obstacle seems consistent in preventing this from occurring:
the AAPL. In 2008, the AAPL issued a motion stating that it would
“not proceed to develop a licensing bill in Texas.”243 Those inside the
AAPL seem to believe that the current voluntary professional certifi-
cation opportunities are the most logical way to resolve the unethical
behavior that occurs in the profession.244 However, as new technology
aids the spread of oil and gas exploration, state legislature licensing
efforts are likely to multiply.245 Unfortunately, the AAPL passively
permits states to propose regulation instead of actively seeking regula-
tion that could benefit its members. Despite opposition from some
AAPL members, it may be necessary for other members that under-
stand the benefits of regulatory licensing to actively engage the AAPL
and its local chapters to encourage licensing statutes, especially in
Texas.
VII. CONCLUSION
By researching property records and negotiating oil and gas leases,
landmen are an essential part of the oil and gas business. Surprisingly,
they are not regulated, which is even more shocking when compared
to similar professions. There are several reasons to regulate landmen,
including protecting landowners from unscrupulous landmen using
fraudulent or misleading lease tactics. Texas attempted to regulate
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landmen in 2009 but failed. Despite other states like Maryland and
North Carolina requiring registration for landmen, Texas has contin-
ued to resist regulatory possibilities.
Given the recent developments in urban drilling and extraction
technologies, this Article advocates for regulation of the landman pro-
fession. In fact, regulation is in the best interest of landmen, oil and
gas companies, and the general public because it will help eliminate
unscrupulous landmen from the market. However, this new regulation
cannot be oblivious to the political economy. Even though regulation
is probably inevitable, a top-down approach originating from the state
legislature or groups opposed to oil and gas exploration will likely be
met with fierce resistance from industry insiders. Instead, the AAPL is
in the best position to offer regulatory requirements and oversight for
landmen. Landmen within the AAPL that recognize the benefits of
regulatory licensing should be proactive in encouraging the AAPL to
lobby for meaningful regulation that eliminates the “curbstoners” and
helps protect the integrity of the occupation.
